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We discuss long code problem in the Bennett-Brassard
1984 (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol and describe
how they can be overcome by concatenation of the protocol.
Observing that concatenated modified Lo-Chau protocol fi-
nally reduces to the concatenated BB84 protocol, we give the
unconditional security of the concatenated BB84 protocol.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Information processing with quantum systems enables
what seems to be impossible with its classical counterpart
[1,2,3,4,5].
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [6,7,8,9] is one of
the most interesting and important quantum informa-
tion processings. QKD seems to become the first practi-
cal quantum information processor [10]. Although secu-
rity of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) QKD [6] had
been widely conjectured based on the no-cloning theo-
rem [11,12], it is quite recently that its unconditional
security was shown [13,14,15]. In particular, Shor and
Preskill [15] showed the security of BB84 scheme by el-
egantly using the connections among several basic ideas
in quantum information processings, i.e. quantum error
correcting codes (QECCs) [16,17] and entanglement pu-
rification [18].
A. Long code problem and concatenated BB84
protocol
The Shor-Preskill proof affords security for a certain
type of BB84 protocol [15] where we perform error correc-
tion and privacy amplification by a classical code associ-
ated with Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) quantum code
[16,17,19]. For a chosen code and a given error rate of
the communication channels, Alice (the sender) and Bob
(the receiver) can calculate Eve’s (Eavesdropper’s) infor-
mation on the final key. What Alice and Bob would want
is to make Eve’s information on the whole final key less
than what they regard as negligible, for example, one bit.
This can be done by choosing an appropriate code for the
given error rate.
However, the Shor-Preskill proof does not place any
bounds on the amount of effort Alice and Bob must do
in decoding of the classical error correcting code associ-
ated with the CSS code [19]. In particular, when the code
length is large the decoding is not so simple [15]. One
might say that we need not worry about the problem
so much because we can do it by a code with a moder-
ate length. However, we can easily see that it is risky:
Let us consider case where the number of bits is n and
the error rate is r (0 ≤ r ≤ 1). Then the probability
distribution of the error rate will be peaked at r with
standard deviation σ ∼
√
r(1 − r)/n. When the number
of bits n is one thousand and the error rate r is 10%, the
standard deviation is about 0.949%. This means that
the probability that the real error rate will be more than
12.4%(= r + 2.57σ) is 1%. This implies that if they had
assumed that a channel with 10% error rate is below a
threshold, say 12.4%, for the one thousand bits, then the
probability that Alice and Bob will be cheated is 1%.
Note that this is too high a risk for a cryptographic task
where we must achieve an exponentially small probabil-
ity to be cheated. Thus they have to permit large room,
say 20σ, between the error rate of the channel and the
threshold. Then the threshold must be larger than 29.0%
in this case. However, no code is found to work yet if it
exceeds 26.4% [20]. Therefore, the number of bits n must
be large, say one million, in order to obtain the exponen-
tial security. However, as noted previously, decoding such
a long code might be a difficult task [15].
On the otherhand, concatenation is a very useful and
interesting idea in both classical and quantum error cor-
rections [21]. In this method, already-encoded-bits are
used as unit-bits to encode new bits. The itrative pro-
cesses can be repeated as we like. The more they perform
the concatenation processes, the shorter encoded bits be-
comes exponentially. Since the concatenated codes are
not included in the orginal codes, it is nontrivial one to
adopt the concatenated codes for certain tasks. For ex-
ample, it is by using concatenated coding that the fault
tolerant quantum computation become possible [22].
In this paper, we show that the long code problem
can be avoided by the idea of using concatenated BB84
protocol: First, Alice and Bob generate raw keys. Next,
using a classical codes associated with CSS code they
perform error correction and privacy amplification on the
raw keys, as prescribed in the Ref. [15]. As a result they
get first key. The first key is not so much secure (possibly
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due to the long code problem). They perform the error
correction and privacy amplification again in the same
way on the first key and then they obtain the second
key. They repeat this process until the estimated leaked
information on the final key is negligible.
In section II, first we give the concatenated modified
Lo-Chau protocol. This protocol reduces to the concate-
nated CSS code protocol that reduces to the concate-
nated BB84 protocol. In section III, we discuss the secu-
rity of the concatenated schemes and how the concate-
nated protocol solves the long code problem. In section
IV, we give discussion and conclusion.
B. Notation
In this paper, we use mostly the notations in Refs.
[15,23].
The canonical basis of a qubit consists of |0〉 and |1〉.
We define another basis as follows. |0¯〉 = (1/√2)(|0〉 +
|1〉) and |1¯〉 = (1/√2)(|0〉 − |1〉). H is the Hadamard
transform. This transformation interchanges the bases
|0〉, |1〉 and |0¯〉, |1¯〉. I = σ0 is the identity operator and
σx, σy, σz are the Pauli operators. The σa(i) denotes
the Pauli operator σa acting on the i-th qubit where a =
0, x, y, z. For a binary vector s, we let σ
[r]
a = σ
s1
a(1)σ
s2
a(2) ·
· ·σsna(n), where si is the i-th bit of s and σ0a = I, σ1a = σa.
The Bell basis are the four maximally entangled state,
|Ψ±〉 = (1/√2)(|01〉 ± |10〉) and |Φ±〉 = (1/√2)(|00〉 ±
|11〉).
Let us consider two classical binary codes, C1 and C2,
such that {0} ⊂ C2 ⊂ C1 ⊂ Fn2 where Fn2 is the binary
vector space of the n bits. A set of basis for the CSS
code can be obtained from vectors v ∈ C1 as follows, v →
(1/|C2|1/2)
∑
w∈C2
|v +w〉. Note that v1 and v2 give the
same vector if v1−v2 ∈ C2. H1 is the parity check matrix
for the code C1 and H2 is that for C
⊥
2 , the dual of C2.
Qx,z is a class of QECCs. For v ∈ C1, the corresponding
code word is v → (1/|C2|1/2)
∑
w∈C2
(−1)z·w|x+ v + w〉.
II. CONCATENATED BB84 PROTOCOL
First, we give the concatenated modified Lo-Chau pro-
tocol. This scheme reduces to the concatenated CSS
codes protocol that reduces to the concatenated BB84
protocol.
We consider a doubly concatenated scheme of the
[[n1, k1, d1]] and [[n2, k2, d2]] CSS codes [16,17]. It is clear
that it can be generalized to multiple-concatenation in
the same ways.
Protocol A: Concatenated modified Lo-Chau protocol.
The first stage: (1) Alice creates 2n1n2 EPR pairs
in the state |Φ+〉⊗(2n1n2). (2) Alice selects a random
(2n1n2)-bit string b. She performs a Hadamard opera-
tion on second half of each EPR pair for which the com-
ponent of b is one. (3) Alice sends the second half of
each EPR pair to Bob. (4) Bob receives the qubits and
publically announces this fact. (5) Alice announces the
bit string b. (6) Bob undoes the Hadamard operations
in step 2. (7) Alice selects randomly n1n2 of the 2n1n2
EPR pairs to serve as check-bits. (8) Alice and Bob each
measure their halves of the n1n2 check EPR pairs in the
{|0〉, |1〉} basis and share the results. If too many of these
measurements disagree, they abort the scheme (9) Alice
randomly chooses n1 unencoded qubits. She repeats this
until all code bits are used. As a result, she gets n2 sets
of code bits whose number of elements is all n1. She an-
nounces her choices to Bob. (10) For each set, they make
the measurements of σ
[r]
z for each row r ∈ H1 and σ[r]x
for each row r ∈ H2 of the [[n1, k1, d1]] CSS code. Alice
and Bob share the results, compute the syndromes for
bit and phase flips, and then transforms their state so as
to obtain k1n2 once-encoded high-fidelity EPR pairs.
In the next stage, Alice and Bob do essentially the
same operations on the k1n2 once-encoded EPR pairs as
they have done on un-encoded EPR pairs in the previous
stage.
The second stage: (1) Alice randomly chooses n2 once-
encoded qubits. She repeats this until all code bits are
used. As a result, there are k1 sets whose number of ele-
ments is n2. She announces her choices to Bob. (2) For
each set, Alice and Bob make the measurements of σ
[r]
z
for each row r ∈ H1 and σ[r]x for each row r ∈ H2 of the
[[n2, k2, d2]] CSS code. They share the results, compute
the syndromes for bit and phase flips, and then trans-
forms their state so as to obtain k1k2 doubly-encoded
EPR pairs. (3) Alice and Bob measure the EPR pairs
in the doubly encoded {|0〉, |1〉} basis to obtain k1k2-bit
final key. ✷
Let us now consider reduction of the protocol. The
same arguments used in Ref. [15] applies here. The dif-
ference is that they measure the syndrome twice at both
level of concatenation, that is, un-encoded qubits and
once-encoded qubits.
Protocol B: Concatenated CSS code protocol.
The first stage: (1) Alice creates n1n2 random check
bits and a random (2n1n2)-bit string b. (2) Alice chooses
n2 n1-bit string xi and zi at random (i = 1, 2, ..., n2). (3)
Alice prepares k1n2 once-encoded bits in a state |00 · · ·0〉
using [[n1, k1, d1]] CSS code Qxi,zi .
The second stage: (1) Alice creates a random k1k2-
bit key-string k′. (2) Alice chooses k1 n2-bit string x
′
j
and z′j at random (j = 1, 2, ..., k1). (3) Alice encodes
her key |k′〉 using the once-encoded qubits prepared in
the step 3 of the first stage with the [[n2, k2, d2]] CSS
code Qx′
j
,z′
j
. (4) Alice randomly chooses n1n2 positions
out of 2n1n2 and puts the unencoded check bits in these
positions. She randomly permutes the qubits of the dou-
bly encoded code bits of the previous step. She puts
them in the remaining positions. (5) Alice performs the
Hadamard operation on each qubit for which the com-
ponent of b is one. (6) Alice sends the resulting state
to Bob. Bob acknowledge the receipt of the qubits. (7)
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Alice announces the string b, the positions and values of
unencoded check bits, the random permutation and each
xi, zi and x
′
j , z
′
j . (8) Bob undoes the Hadamard oper-
ation and random permutation. (9) Bob measures un-
encoded check-bits in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis and announces
the results to Alice. If too many of these measurements
disagree, they abort the scheme. (10) Bob measures the
qubits in the doubly encoded {|0〉, |1〉} basis to obtain
k1k2-bit final key with near-perfect security. ✷
Let us consider reduction of the concatenated CSS code
protocol to the concatenated BB84 protocol. We can ap-
ply the same arguments used in Ref. [15]. The difference
is that reductions process involved with Eq. (4) in Ref.
[15] are performed twice at both level of concatenation.
Protocol C: Concatenated BB84 protocol.
The first stage: (1) Alice creates 4n1n2(1 + δ) random
bits. (2) Alice chooses a random 4n1n2(1 + δ)-bit string
b. For each bit, she creates a state in the {|0〉, |1〉} and
{|0¯〉, |1¯〉} basis, if the corresponding component of the
bit b is zero and one, respectively. (3) Alice sends the
resulting qubits to Bob. (4) Bob receives the 4n1n2(1 +
δ) qubits, measuring each in the {|0〉, |1〉} and {|0¯〉, |1¯〉}
basis at random. (5) Alice announces b. (6) Bob discards
any results where he measured a different basis than Alice
prepared. With high probability, there are at least 2n1n2
bits left. Alice decides randomly on a set of 2n1n2 bits to
use for the protocol, and chooses at random n1n2 of these
to be check-bits. (7) Alice and Bob announce the values
of the their check-bits. If too few of these values agree,
they abort the protocol. (8) Alice announces u+v, where
v is a string consisting of randomly chosen code-bits, and
u is a random code word in C1 of the [[n1, k1, d1]] code.
Alice announces the n1 positions of the randomly chosen
code-bits. (9) Repeat the previous step n2 times, until
all code-bits are consumed. (10) Bob subtracts each u+v
from each of his code-bits, v + ǫ, and corrects the result,
u+ ǫ, to a codeword in C1 of the [[n1, k1, d1]] code. (11)
Alice and Bob use the coset of each u+C2 as the key. In
this way, they obtain k1n2-bit string.
The second stage: (1) Alice announces u + v, where v
is a string consisting of randomly chosen code-bits, and
u is a random code word in C2 of the [[n2, k2, d2]] code.
Alice announces the n2 positions of the randomly chosen
code-bits. (2) Repeat the previous step at k1 times, until
all code-bits are consumed. (3) Bob subtracts each u+ v
from his each code qubits, v + ǫ, and corrects the result,
u + ǫ, to a codeword in C1 of the [[n2, k2, d2]] code. (4)
Alice and Bob use the coset of each u+C2 as the key. In
this way, they obtain k1k2-bit key. ✷
III. SECURITY OF THE PROTOCOL
What we want to show is the security of the protocol
C, the cancatenated BB84 protocol. However, it is suffi-
cient for us to show the security of the protocol A, since
the protocol A reduces to the protocol C. Accordingly
arguments in the following are for the protocol A that
accompanies entanglement purification.
The security of modified Lo-Chau protocol is based on
the idea of random sampling [15,24]: Based on the mea-
sured error rate in the check-bits, Alice and Bob estimate
actual error rate in the code-bits. Since the check-bits
are randomly chosen, they can do it with a high reliabil-
ity. Thus they can correct errors with a high reliability.
(It is not misleading to use notations of QECCs in the
discussion of entanglement purification because they are
equivalent to each other here.)
It is not difficult to intuitively understand how the pro-
tocol A is secure. When the estimated actual error rate in
the code-bits is not low enough, they cannot obtain EPR
pairs with a fidelity that is satisfactorily high. However,
in most cases the fidelity has become higher. By iter-
ating the entanglement purification, they can make the
fidelity become higher and higher. The protocol A is se-
cure when EPR pairs have high enough fidelity, since the
almost perfect fidelity implies the almost perfect secu-
rity [25,15]. This is indeed the original idea of quantum
privacy amplification [26].
Let us give a more detailed description. The probabil-
ity distribution of the number of actual errors forms an
approximate Gaussian distribution whose deviation de-
pends on the length of code. The longer the codes is, the
smaller the deviation is. A rigorous relavant equation re-
garding random sampling for this estimation is given in
Ref. [24]. Let us consider the example considered in in-
troduction. The error rate r is 10%. The number of code-
bits n is one thousand and thus the standard deviation
is about 0.949%. This means that the probability that
the real error rate will be less than 12.4%(= r+2.57σ) is
99%. Therefore, if the threshold of the error correcting
code is greater than 12.4%, the error rate of purified EPR
pairs will be less than 1%, that is much smaller than the
original error rate 10%. By repeating this operation, the
fidelity can be made arbitrily small. Let us estimate how
error rate r decreases with iteration of purification. For a
given length of code n, the deviation σ is approximately
proportional to
√
r. (See introduction.) Let us denote
i-th error rate and deviation by ri and σi, respectively,
where i is positive integer. Then we can get a relation
ri+1 ∼ exp(−T 2/σ2i ) = exp(−T 2/ri) when r ∼ 0. Here
constant T is the threshold of the code. We can see that
i-th error rate ri super-exponentially decreases with re-
spect to i. Fidelity is proportional to 1 − r and thus
almost perfect fidelity can be obtained.
In the protocol A, Alice randomly chooses sets of
qubits to be used for syndrome measurement. This cor-
responds to random choice of code-bits to be used for
error correction and privacy amplification (in the step 8
of the first stage and the step 1 of the second stage) in
the Protocol C. It should be noted that the randomness
in the choice is essential in the proposed protocol: The
error rate is what is averaged for all n1n2 check-bits.
Unless the choice for the code-bits is random, Eve can
succesfully cheat by correlating positions of the errors in
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code-bits.
IV. CONCLUSION
In a certain class of BB 84 protocol with proven se-
curity [15], long classical error correcting codes are de-
sired in order to obtain sufficient security. However, it
is not easy to decode long codes. If they use interme-
diate length codes they cannot obtain enough security.
We have shown that this long code problem can be re-
solved by concatenation of the BB 84 protocol. We have
shown the security of the concatenated BB84 protocol:
The concatenated BB84 protocol can be derived from
the concatenated modified Lo-Chau protocol. We have
described how the latter protocol is secure.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
W.-Y. H., M. K., and H. I. are very grateful to Japan
Science Technology Corporation for financial supports
and to Dr. Wang Xiang-Bin for helpful discussions. H.-
W. L. appreciates the financial support from the Brain
Korea 21 Project of Korean Ministry of Education. J.K.
was supported by Korea Research Foundation Grant 070-
C00029.
∗ Present address: Center for Photonic Communication and
Computing, Northwestern University, 2145 N Sheridan
Road, Evanston, IL 60208, USA; Email address: wyh-
wang@ece.northwestern.edu
[1] S. Wiesner, Sigact News 15(1), 78 (1983).
[2] P. Shor, Proc. 35th Ann. Symp. on Found. of Computer
Science. (IEEE Comp. Soc. Press, Los Alomitos, CA, 1994)
124-134.
[3] J.P. Dowling, Phys. Rev. A 57, 4736 (1998).
[4] A. Delgado, W.P. Schleich, and G. Su¨ssmann, New Journal
of Physics 4, 37.1 (2002).
[5] W.Y. Hwang, D. Ahn, S.W. Hwang, and Y.D. Han, Eur.
Phys. J. D 19, 129 (2002).
[6] C.H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in : Proc. IEEE Int. Conf.
on Computers, systems, and signal processing, Bangalore
(IEEE, New York, 1984) p.175.
[7] A.K. Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661 (1991).
[8] C.H. Bennett, G. Brassard, and N.D. Mermin, Phys.
Rev.Lett. 68, 557 (1992).
[9] C.H. Bennett, Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 3121 (1992).
[10] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, H. Zbinden, Rev. Mod.
Phys. 74, 145 (2002), references therein.
[11] D. Dieks, Phys. Lett. A 92, 271 (1982).
[12] W.K. Wootters and W.H. Zurek, Nature 299, 802 (1982).
[13] D. Mayers, J. Assoc. Comput. Mach. 48, 351 (2001).
[14] E. Biham, M. Boyer, P.O. Boykin, T. Mor, and V. Roy-
chowdhury, in Proceedings of the Thirty-Second Annual
ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (ACM Press,
New York, 2000), pp.715-724, quant-ph/9912053.
[15] P.W. Shor and J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441 (2000).
[16] A.R. Calderbank and P.W. Shor, Phys. Rev. A 54, 1098
(1996).
[17] A.M. Steane, Phys. Rev. Lett. 77, 793 (1996).
[18] C.H. Bennett, D.P. DiVincenzo, J.A. Smolin, and W.K.
Wootters, Phys. Rev. A 54, 3824 (1996).
[19] M.A. Nielsen and I.L. Chuang, Quantum Computation and
Quantum Information (Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 2000).
[20] D. Gottesman and H.-K. Lo, quant-ph/0105121.
[21] J. Preskill, quant-ph/9705031.
[22] D. Gottesman, quant-ph/9903099.
[23] H.-K. Lo, Quan. Inf. Com. 1, 81 (2001).
[24] H.-K. Lo, H.F. Chau, and M. Ardehali, quant-ph/0011056.
[25] H.-K. Lo and H.F. Chau, Science 283, 2050 (1999).
[26] D. Deutsch, A. Ekert, R. Jozsa, C. Macchiavello, S.
Popescu, and A. Sanpera, Phys. Rev. Lett. 77, 2818
(1996): 80, 2022 (E) (1996).
4
